More concern about Biden's possible easing of sanctions against Iran, from Jonathan Spyer in the JC.
Both Qassem Soleimani and his friend, protégé, and key lieutenant in Iraq, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were assassinated by a drone strike authorised by Trump a year ago. It proved to be a key moment in Tehran's declining influence in the Middle East:
The demise of the two men, combined with intense US sanctions, has brought the Iranian militia structure in the Middle East to its knees. But whether the incoming US administration will maintain that pressure is an open question — one that keeps leaders up at night across the region.
Iran’s proxy network was one of the main beneficiaries of the collapse of governance across the region that began with the Arab Spring. In Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the crumbling of the state allowed Soleimani to plant his client groups, building covert Iranian strength.
In all of these countries, the goal was the same. Tehran did not seek to capture official state power. Rather, it wanted to transform the state into a weakened host body, allowing its parasitic militia to act with impunity. The long list of its armed groups shows the scale of the threat: the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, Kata’ib Hezbollah — Muhandis’ organisation — in Iraq, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Afghan Fatemiyoun group and the Pakistani Liwa Zainebiyoun — not to mention the myriad of militia in Syria.
Over the last two years, however, their advance has been halted, if not reversed. Largely, this has been achieved by the US, and is one of Donald Trump’s most notable foreign policy legacies.
The assassinations were followed by dire threats from Tehran of the consequences for America. All talk, though. Nothing has actually happened to back up the endless rousing speeches. And it's become clear that, in the case of Soleimani at least, his particular twisted genius has not been replaceable.
Alongside the drone strike that killed Soleimani and Muhandis came the US policy of “maximum pressure”. The sanctions imposed on the Iranian oil, financial and banking sectors in 2018 starved the economy of funds. This meant the closing of the tap for the militias. Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, suffered a 40 per cent reduction funding in 2020. Similarly, the four top pro-Iran militias in Iraq saw their income fall from £3-4m per month to £1-2m.
The absent leadership and lack of money is having a dramatic affect. In Syria, where there is no large Shia population, Iran has had to use cash to entice recruits. This is no longer available. In Iraq, discipline and unity have begun to break down. In their own right, the powerful militias control oil fields, checkpoints, property and land. They are not prepared to mutely follow orders from fresh commanders for whom they have little respect.
There is now a real possibility that the winds are about to change once again in Iran’s favour. President-elect Joe Biden has made clear his desire to re-negotiate the 2015 nuclear accords with Iran. As a prerequisite, the theocracy is insisting on the lifting of all sanctions. In an attempt to focus American minds, it has threatened to expel international nuclear inspectors from the country on 21 February unless the money starts to flow again.
It's up to Biden now. If he carries through with his stated plan to renew the JCPOA in some form - which would seem likely given his reinstatement of so many key Obama figures in his new administration - then all the advances of the past few years may be lost, and Iran may once again have the power to wreck the neighbourhood.
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