The war in Syria isn't so much winding down, as changing shape. Jonathan Spyer, in FP, on Syria 2.0:
There are three main “players” in Syria today: the regime-Iran-Russian bloc, which controls over half of the country’s territory and the majority of its population; the Kurdish-led and U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which controls the oil-rich area of southern Deir Ezzor and much of the country’s best agricultural land; and the alliance between Turkey (and to a smaller degree Qatar) and the Sunni Islamist and jihadi rebels of northwest Syria. But these broad “camps” are not closed structures: Different members maintain their own relations with specific elements of the rival camp. Thus, Turkey and the United States are ostensible NATO allies, though the United States is directly opposed to some of the jihadi rebel groups with whom Turkey cooperates.
If President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent statements suggesting a Turkish intent to attack the city of Manbij are serious, this would set Ankara on a collision course with U.S. interests. The Kurds maintain relations with Russia and the Assad regime, although their de facto autonomous area is mainly guaranteed by the United States.
Israel is aligned with the United States, but it relies on its functioning relationship with Russia to ensure its ability to act against regime and Iran-associated targets in southern Syria, which are themselves aligned with Russia, and so on.
The new contests in Syria derive not from internal Syrian dynamics, but from the rival interests of outside powers pursued over the ruins of Syria: Turks against Kurds, Israel against Iran and its proxies, the United States against Iran, and now, potentially, Ankara against Washington. These external forces are all determined to gain advantage over one another in Syria. And so, even as Syria’s two longstanding conflicts wind down, war and strife are not departing the area. Welcome to Syria 2.0.
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