I made a brief note last week of Simon Jenkins' all-too-predictable proposal after the latest North Korean nuclear test, that sanctions against Pyongyang should be dropped because they're not working. I also noted that North Koreans themselves were clearly concerned about the effect of more sanctions on their already difficult lives - a concern which is expressed through an increasing scepticism about the Young Leader's propensity for sabre-rattling and brinksmanship.
Now, for a more detailed look at the issue, here's Stephan Haggard:
A common refrain is that nothing more can be done. This is simply false; the question is rather the political one of how much the US is willing to escalate. We approached Joshua Stanton, the premier proponent of upping the pressure, and he obliged with a long list of options, some of which we have thought of, others which were new and clever. Some of these proposals go to the multilateral level, such as tightening loopholes like the livelihood exemption which has allowed China to continue to import coal and other minerals, North Korea’s largest export item. (His terrific idea: require that all livelihood exemptions require an offsetting food purchase by North Korea).
But he points out that there are a host of things the US could do with allies and by itself, but among those with more substantial effect: more robust secondary sanctions on Chinese entities doing business with North Korea, with some significant test cases to show seriousness of intent; convincing countries to end altogether the reflagging that permits North Korean shipping to continue; and pressing for an end to labor exports, which Marcus Noland and I argue is justified on human rights grounds quite apart from its utility as a sanctions measure....
Read on for all of Stanton's proposals, and more...
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